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 Justice Bertha Wilson: 
A Classically Liberal Judge 
Kent Roach* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Bertha Wilson will be remembered as the first woman to sit on the 
Supreme Court. Historians will look to her decisions in R. v. Morgentaler1 
and R. v. Lavallee2 as signs that, to paraphrase Justice Wilson’s famous 
speech, she really did make a difference as the first woman judge to sit on 
the Supreme Court.3 It is undeniable that Justice Wilson made a 
difference. It is very likely that Justice Wilson’s gender and her 
experiences with discrimination4 shaped her personality and her approach 
to judging. Nevertheless, in this essay, I will argue that Justice Wilson’s 
approach to judging was most influenced by her classical liberalism that 
defended the rights of the individual against the power of the state. Justice 
Wilson was a feminist, but first and foremost, she was a liberal.  
Justice Wilson’s classical liberalism is evident in her decisions about 
criminal justice and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.5 In 
many of these decisions, she sided with the individual over the state. She 
expressed a preference for tests that would encompass individuals in all 
their idiosyncrasies and would require the state to establish subjective 
fault. In some of these cases, Justice Wilson reached decisions that 
favoured women, but in others she made decisions that arguably put 
women at risk. Justice Wilson was a principled judge in the sense that 
she did not tailor her judgments to obtain results that would benefit 
                                                                                                             
*
 Professor of Law and Prichard and Wilson Chair in Law and Public Policy, University of 
Toronto. I thank Jamie Cameron for helpful comments on an earlier draft. 
1
 [1988] S.C.J. No. 1, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Morgentaler”]. 
2
 [1990] S.C.J. No. 36, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 852 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Lavallee”]. 
3
 Bertha Wilson, “Will Women Judges Really Make a Difference?” (1990) 28 Osgoode 
Hall L.J. 507. 
4
 Ellen Anderson, Judging Bertha Wilson: Law as Large as Life (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2001), chapters 3, 4 and 7. 
5
 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
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certain groups including women. Befitting her experience as a Bay Street 
lawyer where sub-clauses and commas can make all the difference, she 
carefully engaged with the text and the purposes of the laws that she 
interpreted.  
In the first part of this essay, I will address the question of what is a 
classical liberal. I will focus on Justice Wilson’s judgment in 
Morgentaler which, to my mind, epitomizes her philosophical approach. 
Although this landmark judgment is influenced by feminism in the sense 
that Justice Wilson writes from the perspective of a woman, I will argue 
that it is ultimately grounded in classical liberalism. More than any other 
judgment, Morgentaler reveals the essence of Justice Wilson’s approach 
to judging. 
Following the structure of her judgment in Morgentaler, this essay 
will then examine how classical liberalism informed Justice Wilson’s 
approach to the procedural protections owed to the individual and the 
substantive content of the criminal law. Although Justice Wilson 
criticized the approach taken by her colleagues in Morgentaler as merely 
procedural, Justice Wilson’s own procedural decisions were firmly 
grounded in liberal principles. The culmination of her principled and 
moralized approach to procedure can be seen in her ringing concurrence 
in Law Society of British Columbia v. Andrews6 where she justified 
extending equality protections to the non-enumerated group of non-
citizens on the grounds that their right to equal concern and respect was 
likely to be neglected and ignored by legislatures. The Andrews 
approach to equality also illuminates Justice Wilson’s approach to 
criminal law because she was well aware that those accused of crime are 
themselves an unpopular group and that other disadvantaged groups 
were overrepresented in their numbers.  
With respect to the substantive content of the criminal law, Justice 
Wilson’s liberal and individualist approach meant that she favoured 
wherever possible a subjective approach to fault that took into account all 
the characteristics and idiosyncrasies of the individual. At the same time, 
Justice Wilson was a principled judge who respected clear decisions by 
Parliament to employ objective standards to limit the ambit of defences. In 
cases such as R. v. Hill7 and Lavallee, she grappled with the difficult 
problem of how objective standards should be applied in a contextual 
manner that was fair to all.  
                                                                                                             
6
 [1989] S.C.J. No. 6, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Andrews”]. 
7
 [1986] S.C.J. No. 25, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 313 (S.C.C.). 
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Finally, I will examine how Justice Wilson’s classical liberalism 
informed her unflinching and rigorous approach to the Oakes8 standard 
of justification. Justice Wilson did not share the ambivalence towards the 
state that is found in the section 1 jurisprudence of many of her 
colleagues, including Chief Justice Dickson and Justices Lamer and La 
Forest.9 Her approach was frequently a dissenting one, but it served as a 
pole star that helped ensure that the Court never lost sight of the fact that 
section 1 of the Charter required the state to justify why it was necessary 
to infringe rights. I will argue that this approach to section 1 was 
ultimately grounded in liberal principles that stressed the importance of 
protecting all individuals from the state.  
II. MORGENTALER AND THE CORE OF CLASSICAL LIBERALISM 
By a classical liberal, I mean a person who places a premium on 
individual freedom and liberty and who holds state incursions on liberty 
to strict standards of justification. A liberal can be contrasted with a 
communitarian who places a premium on the ability of the state to 
articulate its collective values and to protect itself from danger. All 
feminists are concerned with the historical and contemporary 
disadvantages of women in society, but there can be liberal and less 
liberal feminists.10 A liberal feminist would see the individual as the 
fundamental building block of society and would have concerns about 
injustice to any individual. A less liberal communitarian or radical 
feminist would see groups as the fundamental building block of society 
and would be more enthusiastic about using state power, including 
criminal law, to rectify the disadvantages suffered by groups such as 
women. Such a feminist might be less likely to conclude that an 
individual has suffered an injustice at the hands of the state if the state 
                                                                                                             
8
 R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.). 
9
 For an account of the Court at that time, see R.J. Sharpe & Kent Roach, Brian Dickson: 
A Judge’s Journey (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003). 
10
 Liberal and conservative approaches to the criminal law are well known and symbolized 
in the famous debate between H.L.A. Hart and Lord Devlin: see H.L.A. Hart, Law, Liberty and 
Morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963) and Lord Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals 
(Oxford: Oxford University, 1965). Feminists reject classical liberalism or classical conservatism, 
but they do differ in their orientation towards the state and their focus on the individual or the group 
as most important social actor. Catherine MacKinnon has written that “[l]iberal feminism takes the 
individual as the proper unit of analysis and measure of the destructiveness of sexism. For radical 
feminism, although the person is kept in view, the touchstone for analysis and outrage is the 
collective ‘group called woman’”: Catherine MacKinnon, Towards a Feminist Theory of the State 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), at 40. 
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was acting to ameliorate the disadvantages of a group or to protect 
vulnerable groups from harm.  
Justice Wilson, with her emphasis on the rights of all individuals and 
the rights of the accused, stands at the liberal end of the spectrum while 
the second woman appointed to the Supreme Court, Justice Claire 
L’Heureux-Dubé, stands at the communitarian end with her skepticism 
about many rights claims by the accused and her deference towards the 
state’s crime control interests. The differences between the two 
distinguished jurists are well illustrated in R. v. Martineau,11 where 
Justice Wilson agreed with Justice Lamer that the stigma and penalty of 
a murder conviction required that the Crown prove the accused knew 
that the victim was likely to die. In a dissenting opinion, Justice 
L’Heureux-Dubé argued that negligence was a sufficient fault level even 
for murder and that the “concern that these offenders not endure the Mark 
of Cain is, in my view, an egregious example of misplaced compassion”. 12 
In R. v. Swain,13 Justice Wilson concluded that the accused’s Charter 
right to control his or her own defence, as well as the equality rights of 
those with mental disorders, would be violated if the Crown was allowed 
to argue that the accused was insane and should be detained on that basis 
before the accused had been convicted on the merits. Justice L’Heureux-
Dubé dissented on the basis that the traditional rule that allowed the 
Crown to raise the insanity defence before the accused was convicted 
was consistent with the principles of fundamental justice which, in her 
view, included social protection against dangerous people who were 
insane when they committed a crime. The fact that both Justice Wilson 
and Justice L’Heureux-Dubé were feminists who equally wished to 
counter the historical subordination of women and other disadvantaged 
groups should not obscure the deep philosophical differences between 
the two jurists. 
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 [1990] S.C.J. No. 84, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Martineau”]. 
12
 For a remarkably candid defence of Justice L’Heureux-Dubé’s frequent dissents in 
criminal law matters, her concerns that the Court’s decisions favoured the individual accused too 
much over the collective interests of the community and the discovery of the truth in the criminal 
justice system, her sympathy for crime victims and the job of Crown prosecutors and her use of 
s. 15 of the Charter as a shield for the crime control activities of the state, see Claire L’Heureux-
Dubé, “The Charter of Rights and the Administration of Criminal Justice in Canada: Where We 
Have Been and Where We Should Go” (2006) 3 Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law 473. For a 
rebuttal of Justice L’Heureux-Dubé’s view, see Peter Sankoff, “Generally Speaking Canada is 
Going in the Right Direction: A Response to Justice L’Heureux-Dubé” (2006) 3 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 
491.  
13
 [1991] S.C.J. No. 32, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 933 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Swain”]. 
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Justice Wilson’s most important decision was likely her concurring 
judgment in Morgentaler, which found that Canada’s 1969 law 
restricting abortions unless approved by a hospital committee and 
performed in a hospital was an unjustified violation of section 7 of the 
Charter. Justice Wilson criticized Chief Justice Dickson and Justice 
Beetz for stressing the procedural flaws in the legislation that made the 
defence to the crime of having or performing an abortion apply in an 
arbitrary manner in different parts of Canada. Justice Wilson was 
concerned with the merits of the abortion issue and she was not 
embarrassed to cite American substantive due process precedents such as 
Roe v. Wade14 as support for her view that women should have freedom 
of choice at least in the first trimester of her pregnancy. The differences 
between Justice Wilson and her colleagues were far from academic. For 
example, Justice Wilson’s approach would have likely invalidated a bill 
that was defeated by a tied vote in the Senate that would have imposed 
criminal regulation on even early abortions.15  
The part of Justice Wilson’s judgment that caught headlines and 
cemented her reputation as a feminist judge was her statement that “It is 
probably impossible for a man to respond, even imaginatively,” to the 
dilemma of an unwanted pregnancy “not just because it is outside the 
realm of his personal experience (although this is, of course, the case) 
but because he can relate to it only by objectifying it, thereby eliminating 
the subjective elements of the female psyche which are at the heart of the 
dilemma.”16 To be sure, this passage reflected the experience of 
women,17 but it was not a pro-choice statement as contended by some 
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 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
15
 F.L. Morton, Morgentaler vs. Borowski (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1992), 
chapter 23. 
16
 Morgentaler, supra, note 1, at 171. 
17
 Justice Wilson added that 
the history of the struggle for human rights from the eighteenth century on has been the 
history of men struggling to assert their dignity and common humanity against an 
overbearing state apparatus. The more recent struggle for women’s rights has been a struggle 
to eliminate discrimination, to achieve a place for women in a man’s world, to develop a set 
of legislative reforms in order to place women in the same position as men (pp. 81-82). It 
has not been a struggle to define the rights of women in relation to their special place in the 
societal structure and in relation to the biological distinction between the two sexes. Thus, 
women’s needs and aspirations are only now being translated into protected rights. The right 
to reproduce or not to reproduce which is in issue in this case is one such right and is 
properly perceived as an integral part of modern woman’s struggle to assert her dignity and 
worth as a human being.  
Id., at 172 (emphasis in original). 
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who criticized Justice Wilson as a judicial activist.18 Rather it was a 
prelude to Justice Wilson’s conclusion that the abortion law infringed a 
woman’s freedom of conscience. One sometimes neglected implication 
of this ruling was that it protected a woman’s decision whether or not to 
have an abortion. It did not matter to Justice Wilson as a liberal whether 
a woman decided to have or not have an abortion, and she respected the 
woman’s right to make her own decisions for her own reasons. Although 
the abortion issue obviously had a profound affect on women as a group, 
it was ultimately for Justice Wilson a matter of individual conscience 
and freedom. The context was abortion, but the principle was freedom.19 
The liberalism that drove her Morgentaler judgment is best captured 
in Justice Wilson’s statement that: 
The Charter is predicated on a particular conception of the place of the 
individual in society. An individual is not a totally independent entity 
disconnected from the society in which he or she lives. Neither, 
however, is the individual a mere cog in an impersonal machine in 
which his or her values, goals and aspirations are subordinated to those 
of the collectivity. The individual is a bit of both. The Charter reflects 
this reality by leaving a wide range of activities and decisions open to 
legitimate government control while at the same time placing limits on 
the proper scope of that control. Thus, the rights guaranteed in the 
Charter erect around each individual, metaphorically speaking, an 
invisible fence over which the state will not be allowed to trespass. The 
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 See, for example, Robert Hawkins & Robert Martin, “Democracy, Judging and Bertha 
Wilson” (1995) 41 McGill L.J. 1; F.L. Morton & Rainer Knopff, The Charter Revolution and the 
Court Party (Peterborough, Ont.: Broadview Press, 2000); Robert Bork, Coercing Virtue: The 
Worldwide Rule of Judges (Toronto: Vintage, 2002). For my own arguments that these critics of 
judicial activism discount the anti-majoritarian role of judicial review, and that they have highly 
positivist and unrealistic views of adjudication that conceive of unfettered discretion as the only 
alternative to following clear, black-letter law, see Kent Roach, The Supreme Court on Trial 
(Toronto: Irwin Law, 2001), at chapters 5 and 6.  
19
 As Justice Wilson eloquently explained:  
The idea of human dignity finds expression in almost every right and freedom 
guaranteed in the Charter. Individuals are afforded the right to choose their own religion and 
their own philosophy of life, the right to choose with whom they will associate and how they 
will express themselves, the right to choose where they will live and what occupation they 
will pursue. These are all examples of the basic theory underlying the Charter, namely that 
the state will respect choices made by individuals and, to the greatest extent possible, will 
avoid subordinating these choices to any one conception of the good life.  
Thus, an aspect of the respect for human dignity on which the Charter is founded is the 
right to make fundamental personal decisions without interference from the state. This right 
is a critical component of the right to liberty. Liberty, as was noted in Singh, is a phrase 
capable of a broad range of meaning. In my view, this right, properly construed, grants the 
individual a degree of autonomy in making decisions of fundamental personal importance.  
Morgentaler, supra, note 1, at 166. 
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role of the courts is to map out, piece by piece, the parameters of the 
fence.20 
Although some commentators have struggled to reconcile this 
expression of liberalism with the feminist aspects of the decision, they 
need only have looked at Justice Wilson’s decisions on matters of 
criminal law and procedure.21 Justice Wilson saw most criminal and 
immigration matters22 as ones that involved the state as the sole 
antagonist of the individual.23 To borrow from her spatial analogy in 
Morgentaler, Justice Wilson undertook the task of constructing the fence 
that would protect the individual from the state. As will be seen, section 
1 of the Charter provided a means to allow the state to hop over the 
fence, but Justice Wilson insisted on a high fence that would require the 
state to demonstrate the necessity for incursions on the rights of 
individuals. 
III. PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS FOR THE INDIVIDUAL 
One of the foundations of Justice Wilson’s liberalism was her sense 
that individuals were protected by rights and that the state had special 
obligations to protect and respect the rights of the individual. In 1988, 
she decided a case in favour of Janise Marie Gamble, a woman who had 
been convicted as an accomplice in the first degree murder of a police 
officer in 1976 and had been sentenced to life imprisonment without 
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 Id., at 164. 
21
 Writing in 1991, Christine Boyle recognized that “the core of the judgment is liberal”, 
albeit a “radical liberalism”, that took into account the circumstances of women and took their rights 
seriously: Christine Boyle, “The Role of the Judiciary in the Work of Madame Justice Wilson” 
(1992) 15 Dal. L.J. 241, at 251-52. Writing at the same time, Danielle Pinard similarly concluded 
that “for Justice Wilson, the dignity of the individual is fundamental. It includes the liberty to make 
decisions, to live one’s life in accordance with one’s values”: Danielle Pinard, “The Constituents of 
Democracy: The Individual in the Work of Madame Justice Wilson” (1992) 15 Dal. L.J. 81, at 91. 
[hereinafter “The Constituents of Democracy”]. See also Philip Bryden, “The Democratic Intellect: 
The State in the Work of Madame Justice Wilson” (1992) 15 Dal. L.J. 65, at 90. 
22
 See, for example, Singh v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1985] 
S.C.J. No. 11, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Singh”]. 
23
 Irwin Toy v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 36, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927. Note 
that Wilson J. generally did not have the ambivalence demonstrated by McLachlin J. when in RJR-
MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1995] S.C.J. No. 68, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199 (S.C.C.) 
she recognized that the singular antagonist model could be broken down by considering the rights of 
victims. But see R. v. Keegstra, [1990] S.C.J. No. 131, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Keegstra”], where Wilson J. joined with a majority over a strong dissent by McLachlin J. in 
holding that violations of freedom of expression and the presumption of innocence had been 
justified under s.1 of the Charter. 
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eligibility for parole for 25 years. Gamble had committed a robbery with 
her husband (who subsequently killed himself with a drug overdose), 
another man and another woman. The case could have been seen as one 
in which two women were literally taken along for a deadly ride with 
dominant and perhaps abusive men,24 but Justice Wilson presented the 
case through the lens of procedural fairness and the obligations of the 
state to give the individual the benefit of a reasonable doubt. 
Gamble was sentenced under new first degree murder provisions that 
were introduced when Canada abolished the death penalty. The killing, 
however, took place when Gamble could theoretically have been 
sentenced to death. The older capital murder provisions were in some 
aspects more beneficial to the accused than the newer ones because they 
had a maximum of only 20 years ineligibility for parole, and they would 
require that Gamble’s own act have caused or assisted in causing the 
death of the police officer. Gamble did not shoot the police officer. 
Justice Wilson found that Gamble’s rights under section 7 of the Charter 
had been violated by the continuing adverse effects of having been 
convicted and sentenced under a law not in force at the time the crime 
was committed. She granted Gamble’s request for habeas corpus and 
declared her eligible for parole. Chief Justice Dickson dissented on the 
basis that the Charter could not be applied retroactively to a 1976 
conviction and on the basis that Gamble had not suffered harm by being 
convicted under the wrong law. 
Although her approach could be characterized as giving a convicted 
murderer the benefit of a technicality, the case raised for Justice Wilson 
the special obligations of the state to treat the accused fairly. She 
stressed that it was because of “the Crown’s error that we cannot know for 
sure what would have happened to the appellant had she been tried under 
the proper law. She should accordingly be given the benefit of any 
doubt”.25 The bedrock principle for Justice Wilson was that the individual 
was to be given the benefit of the doubt. That said, she attempted to 
reconcile her judgment with prior holdings that the Charter could not be 
applied retroactively by focusing on the ongoing and contemporary effects 
of the 1976 conviction on Janise Gamble’s liberty. 
The very next year, Justice Wilson dealt with a case involving 
another woman charged with first degree murder, Sharon Turpin. Turpin 
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 Richard Pound, Unlucky to the End: The Story of Janise Marie Gamble (Montreal: 
McGill-Queen’s, 2007). 
25
 R. v. Gamble, [1988] S.C.J. No. 87, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 595, at 647 (S.C.C.). 
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and two men were charged with killing her husband. Under the Criminal 
Code26 as it applied in Ontario at that time, all accused charged with 
murder had to be tried by a judge and jury. Perhaps fearing how a jury 
might react to allegations that she arranged to have her husband killed, 
Sharon Turpin argued that she should have a right to a judge-alone trial 
under the right to a jury trial in section 11(f) of the Charter. She also 
argued that she should have a right to a judge-alone trial under the 
equality rights in section 15 of the Charter because if she had been tried 
in Alberta, she would have had the option of a judge-alone murder trial 
under the Code. Justice Wilson ultimately rejected both of Turpin’s 
arguments, but her reasoning was consistent with her liberal principles as 
well as with her careful attention to the text and purpose of the law. 
Although she eventually concluded that section 11(f) of the Charter 
did not provide a Charter right to a non-jury trial, much of Justice 
Wilson’s judgment focused on whether the accused could waive his or 
her Charter right to a jury. She rejected Australian and American 
authority and Canadian statutory authority on the basis that “[i]n denying 
the individual’s ability to waive his or her right to a jury trial these cases 
advance a collective interest in the utilization of a jury in serious criminal 
charges”.27 This conclusion accorded with her sense that the purpose of 
Charter rights was to protect individuals. Social interests had to be justified 
by the state under section 1 of the Charter. She stressed that: “It will be for 
the accused and his or her counsel and not for the courts to decide which 
course will be in the best interests of the accused in any given case.”28 
Justice Wilson had little time for benevolent paternalism. She recognized 
that women would chronically be victimized by such paternalism, but the 
larger and liberal principle was that all individuals should be able to make 
decisions for themselves. 
As in Morgentaler, Justice Wilson stressed in Turpin the idea that 
rights created a zone of freedom in which each individual was able to 
make decisions. This was classical liberalism in the sense that it took 
individuals as ends in themselves. Justice Wilson was no doubt keenly 
aware that women had been denied the benefits of making judgments 
about what was in their own best interests throughout the ages. 
Nevertheless, she defended liberal principles as ends in themselves. She 
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 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 [hereinafter “Code”]. 
27
 R. v. Turpin, [1989] S.C.J. No. 47, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1296, at 1320 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Turpin”]. 
28
 Id., at 1322. 
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would not impose her own judgments about what was best when any 
person was exercising a constitutionally protected freedom. 
Justice Wilson’s principles informed her approach to judging, but 
they also had to be anchored in the text of the law. She felt comfortable 
concluding that an individual could waive Charter rights because they 
were intended for the benefit of the individual. At the same time, 
however, Charter rights were not a blank slate on which a judge could 
write her own principles into the law. Although Sharon Turpin could 
waive her right to a jury trial, she could not claim a Charter right to a 
non-jury trial because there was “nothing in s. 11(f) to give the 
appellants a constitutional right to elect their mode of trial or a 
constitutional right to be tried by judge alone so as to make s. 11(f) 
inconsistent with the mandatory jury trial provisions of the Criminal 
Code”.29 Although it may be fashionable in some quarters to criticize the 
Court’s and especially Justice Wilson’s approach to the early inter-
pretation of the Charter as one of judicial activism aided and abetted by 
the work of legal academics,30 Justice Wilson was a careful lawyer 
guided by the text of the Charter. In Turpin, she concluded that neither 
the purpose nor the text of the Charter supported a right to a judge-alone 
trial. In the absence of such a Charter right, the provisions of the 
Criminal Code requiring trial by jury would prevail even though they 
enforced collective interests in jury trials to the detriment of individual 
accused such as Sharon Turpin. 
Turpin had one more argument to make, and it was based on section 
15 of the Charter. She argued that her equality rights were denied 
because she would have had the option of a judge-alone trial had she 
been tried in Alberta. Justice Wilson concluded that Sharon Turpin had 
been denied the equal benefit of the law compared to an accused in 
Alberta because she had no choice as to her mode of trial.  
A choice as to having or not having a jury trial (even though limited by 
the overriding determination by the trial judge), based upon the 
advantages of one mode of trial over the other because of a wide range 
of factors, such as: the nature and circumstances of the killing, the 
amount of publicity, the reaction in the community, the size of the 
community from which the jury is being drawn and even the 
preference of defence counsel with respect to trying to convince a jury 
or a judge of the defence version of the facts (or leave them with a 
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 Id., at 1330. 
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 See supra, note 18. 
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reasonable doubt), indicates that having that choice must be considered 
a benefit. The absence of that benefit in Ontario must be considered a 
disadvantage.31 
In this passage, Justice Wilson recognized that the benefit of the jury 
trial could in some circumstances be a disadvantage for the individual 
accused, especially a woman accused of hiring someone to kill her 
husband. That said, Justice Wilson’s focus was not on the empirical 
question of whether an accused could be disadvantaged by a jury trial. 
Rather she focused on the fact that Turpin would have had more freedom 
if she had been tried in Alberta where judge-alone trials were possible in 
murder cases. The principle was liberty and freedom. Freedom for all 
individuals would assist women like Sharon Turpin. 
The conclusion that Turpin had been denied an equal benefit 
extended to similarly situated accused in Alberta, however, did not end 
the equality rights analysis. As she had with respect to section 11(f) of 
the Charter, Justice Wilson returned to the text of the Charter. The text 
of section 15 of the Charter required that the broadly worded equality 
rights be denied with discrimination. She stressed that section 15 
“mandates a case by case analysis as was undertaken by this Court in 
Andrews to determine 1) whether the distinction created by the 
impugned legislation results in a violation of one of the equality rights 
and, if so, 2) whether that distinction is discriminatory in its purpose or 
effect”.32 On the issue of discrimination, she concluded that those 
charged with murder outside Alberta “do not constitute a disadvantaged 
group in Canadian society within the contemplation of s. 15”.33 
Justice Wilson’s conclusion that section 15 was not violated in 
Turpin followed from the Court’s landmark decision in Andrews34 to 
stress the need for a finding of discriminatory effects or purposes for a 
section 15 violation. Justice Wilson’s concurring judgment in Andrews, 
like her Morgentaler judgment, went to the heart of the matter. Again, 
she was not afraid to cite American constitutional law and theory in 
support of her conclusions despite the interest at that time in using 
socialist and Tory touches as a means to distinguish Canadian political 
culture from American political culture.35 In Andrews, she had concluded 
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that non-citizens were an analogous group that should be added to 
section 15 because they were vulnerable to discrimination. She cited 
both the famous Carolene Products36 footnote 4 and supportive 
academic commentary in the United States. She stressed:  
that the range of discrete and insular minorities has changed and will 
continue to change with changing political and social circumstances. 
For example, Stone J. writing in 1938, was concerned with religious, 
national and racial minorities. In enumerating the specific grounds in s. 
15, the framers of the Charter embraced these concerns in 1982 but 
also addressed themselves to the difficulties experienced by the 
disadvantaged on the grounds of ethnic origin, colour, sex, age and 
physical and mental disability. It can be anticipated that the discrete 
and insular minorities of tomorrow will include groups not recognized 
as such today. It is consistent with the constitutional status of s. 15 that 
it be interpreted with sufficient flexibility to ensure the “unremitting 
protection” of equality rights in the years to come.37  
Justice Wilson’s minority centred approach to section 15 of the Charter 
was likely influenced by her feminism. At the same time, her own 
experience as an immigrant and newcomer to Canada also likely made 
her acutely aware of the difficulties faced by non-citizens and other 
outsiders. 
Justice Wilson’s approach to section 15 was also influenced by its 
text. The broad test that found equality rights were violated whenever 
similarly situated persons were not subject to the same treatment did not 
fit with the text of section 15 of the Charter, which required that equality 
rights be violated with discrimination. She was also concerned that such 
an expansive reading of equality rights would have the effect of diluting 
the obligations of the state under section 1 of the Charter to justify limits 
on Charter rights. Justice Wilson’s concerns about disadvantaged 
minorities was an inclusive concern, and it laid the basis for the eventual 
recognition of gays and lesbians as a discrete and insular minority in 
need of protection from majoritarian politics.  
The Court’s more restrained and focused approach to equality rights 
in Andrews may seem inevitable today, but it was vigorously contested 
at the time it was decided. Many lower courts had emphasized the value 
of equal treatment of all, and this was particularly true in the context of 
any unequal application of the criminal law. Justice Wilson recognized 
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that her conclusion in Turpin went against the grain of considerable 
lower court authority,38 but she nevertheless concluded that the idea that 
the same criminal law should apply throughout Canada did not accord 
with either the text or the purpose of section 15 of the Charter. Although 
she was well aware of the disadvantages that Sharon Turpin might suffer 
as a result of being required to face a jury trial for the alleged murder of 
her husband, Justice Wilson concluded that neither the text nor the 
purpose of sections 11(f) or 15 of the Charter supported a right to a trial 
by judge alone. 
Justice Wilson’s most famous procedural decision was her decision 
in Singh v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration)39 that the 
refugee determination procedures in immigration law violated section 7 
of the Charter because they did not provide the applicant with an oral 
hearing. Consistent with liberal principles, she rejected the government’s 
claims that the proceedings were non-adversarial. Justice Wilson 
stressed that the “greatest concern about the procedural scheme … is not, 
therefore, with the absence of an oral hearing in and of itself, but with 
the inadequacy of the opportunity the scheme provides for a refugee 
claimant to state his case and know the case he has to meet”.40 Although 
some refugee applicants may learn of the Minister’s case through a 
formal appeal, others may not. In this sense, Justice Wilson was 
sensitive to unequal treatment among members of a vulnerable group.  
Justice Wilson’s liberalism was also revealed in her rejection in 
Singh of any idea that the non-citizen’s interests could be reduced to the 
status of a privilege revocable by the state as opposed to a right. She also 
rejected the idea that administrative convenience could, as a “utilitarian 
consideration”,41 serve as a justification under section 1 of the Charter 
for a violation of section 7 rights. She viewed the procedural issue 
through the philosophical premises that the interests of the individual 
should be understood as rights, while the interests of the state as a 
representative of the majority should not overwhelm the rights of the 
individual.  
Although Justice Wilson stressed the substantive flaws in the 
abortion law in Morgentaler,42 she was concerned with the procedural 
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protections of the individual in many criminal law and immigration law 
cases. Her approach was informed by a conviction that the accused 
deserved the benefit of the doubt from the state and that individuals 
should have the freedom to choose how to exercise their rights. 
IV. SUBSTANTIVE PROTECTIONS FOR THE INDIVIDUAL 
Like Brian Dickson, Bertha Wilson never practised criminal law but 
was able to make a significant mark on that branch of the law. Justice 
Wilson’s classical liberalism found a natural home in her defence of 
principles of subjective fault. These principles required the state to 
establish beyond a reasonable doubt that a particular accused, with all of 
his or her idiosyncrasies and frailties, was at fault. As with the 
procedural protections examined in the last section, however, Justice 
Wilson’s approach was disciplined by attention to the relevant text and 
purposes of the law. 
Justice Wilson’s fullest defence of the principles of subjective mens 
rea came in her decision in R. v. Tutton 43 which dealt with the Criminal 
Code’s definition of criminal negligence as showing wanton or reckless 
disregard for the life or safety of others. She held that the provision 
should be interpreted as requiring some subjective fault because 
Parliament had not clearly displaced the common law presumption of 
subjective fault. In some respects, Justice Wilson’s decision is mainly of 
historical interest because the objective standard would be applied 
today.44 That said, however, Justice Wilson’s judgment remains a 
powerful defence of principles of subjective fault.  
Tutton dealt with a difficult case in which deeply religious parents 
believed that their diabetic child had been cured by God and stopped 
giving him his prescribed insulin. They were charged with causing their 
son’s death by criminal negligence. The Ontario Court of Appeal had 
sought to respond to the exigencies of the case by holding that a 
subjective standard of fault should be applied to failures to act while the 
objective standard should be applied to acts of commission. The 
Supreme Court rejected this distinction, but was divided 3-3. Justice 
Wilson, with the concurrence of Chief Justice Dickson and Justice La 
Forest, concluded that a subjective standard should apply in all cases of 
criminal negligence. Justice McIntyre, with the concurrence of Justice 
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L’Heureux-Dubé, concluded that an objective standard should apply. It 
is significant that Justice Wilson and Justice L’Heureux-Dubé disagreed 
in this case. Justice Lamer agreed that an objective standard should 
apply, but would have used an individuated standard tailored to some of 
the personal characteristics of the accused such as the accused’s age and 
education. He failed to address whether a person’s religious beliefs were 
relevant to administering this modified objective standard. 
Justice Wilson argued that Parliament’s definition of criminal 
negligence was ambiguous. Although the reference to negligence pointed 
in the direction of an objective standard, the reference to wanton and 
reckless disregard suggested a need to prove some subjective advertence to 
the risk to life or safety. In the face of this ambiguity, she concluded that 
the presumption of subjective fault for criminal offences articulated in pre-
Charter cases such as R. v. Sault Ste. Marie (City)45 and R. v. Pappajohn46 
should apply. Making specific reference to the controversial Pappajohn 
defence of a subjective but not necessarily reasonable mistake of fact, 
Justice Wilson concluded that: “To require, as does my colleague, that all 
misperceptions be reasonable will, in my view, not excuse many of those 
who through no fault of their own cannot fairly be expected to live up to 
the standard of the reasonable person”.47 Justice Wilson’s invocation of 
Pappajohn in 1989 is significant. The decision had attracted sustained 
scholarly criticism from feminist scholars since it had been decided. The 
critiques focused on the effects of the defence of honest but unreasonable 
mistake of fact in sexual assault cases and the focus of the defence on the 
perspective of the accused as opposed to the victim.48 In Tutton, however, 
Justice Wilson invoked the controversial case for the broader proposition 
that subjective standards were best suited to ensuring that all accused were 
treated fairly. 
Justice Wilson stated that she was “cautiously sympathetic to 
attempts to integrate elements of subjective perception into criminal law 
standards that are clearly objective”, but she rejected Justice Lamer’s 
modified objective approach on the grounds that it would inevitably be 
both under and over inclusive when compared to a subjective standard. 
She explained: 
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One problem with attempts to individualize an objective standard is 
that regard for the disabilities of the particular accused can only be 
applied in a general fashion to alter the objective standard. It seems 
preferable to me to continue to address the question of whether a 
subjective standard (a standard, I might add, that in its form is applied 
equally to all and consistent with individual responsibility) has been 
breached in each case than to introduce varying standards of conduct 
which will be only roughly related to the presence or absence of 
culpability in the individual case. Varying the level of conduct by 
factoring in some personal characteristics may be unavoidable if the 
court is faced with a clearly objective standard but it should, in my 
opinion, be avoided if the more exacting subjective test is available as 
a matter of statutory interpretation. I have no doubt that factors such as 
the accused’s age and mental development will often be relevant to 
determining culpability but under a subjective test they will be relevant 
only as they relate to the question of whether the accused was aware of 
or wilfully blind to the prohibited risk and will not have to be factored 
in wholesale in order to adjust the standard of conduct that is expected 
from citizens.49 
Although she was a leader in individuating objective standards to 
make them fairer to those who might be neglected under a simple 
reasonable person standard,50 these statements make clear that an 
individuated reasonable person standard was a definite second best to a 
fully subjective standard for Justice Wilson. A subjective standard was 
the most consistent with “the principles of equality and individual 
responsibility which should pervade the criminal law”.51 As Danielle 
Pinard has recognized, Justice Wilson’s attraction to subjective mens rea 
was related to her concern for the dignity of individuals on their own 
terms.52 
Justice Wilson’s commitment to fault principles was also well 
demonstrated in two decisions dealing with a provision that made it an 
offence subject to life imprisonment for a man to have sex with a girl 
under 14 years of age. She approached this issue not from the 
perspective of either the girl’s wishes or her need for protection from the 
risks of sexual intercourse, but rather from the perspective of whether it 
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was fair to impose the criminal sanction without proof of fault. Justice 
Wilson concluded that the no-fault offence violated section 7 of the 
Charter because it did not respect the dignity of the accused and treated 
him as a means for the achievement of social objectives: 
Our commitment to the principle that those who did not intend to 
commit harm and who took all reasonable precautions to ensure that 
they did not commit an offence should not be imprisoned stems from 
an acute awareness that to imprison a “mentally innocent” person is to 
inflict a grave injury on that person’s dignity and sense of worth. 
Where that person’s beliefs and his actions leading up to the 
commission of the prohibited act are treated as completely irrelevant in 
the face of the state’s pronouncement that he must automatically be 
incarcerated for having done the prohibited act, that person is treated as 
little more than a means to an end. That person is in essence told that 
because of an overriding social or moral objective he must lose his 
freedom even although he took all reasonable precautions to ensure 
that no offence was committed.53 
In this passage, Justice Wilson suggests that principles of fault are 
necessary to treat accused persons as ends in themselves and not as 
instruments in the deterrence of harmful conduct. As in Morgentaler, her 
approach suggested the need for the law to respect how the individual 
exercised his capacity to reason and to make choices.  
Consistent with her concern for the exceptional case as exemplified 
by a focus on subjective fault, Justice Wilson posited a case in which the 
accused genuinely believed that the girl was over 14 years of age. In 
addition, she cast doubt on the idea that deterrence concerns could 
justify a no-fault offence under section 1 when she argued that 
“punishing the mentally innocent with a view to advancing particular 
objectives is fundamentally unfair. It is to use the innocent as a means to 
an end. While utilitarian reasoning may at one time have been 
acceptable, it is my view that when we are dealing with the potential for 
life imprisonment it has no place in a free and democratic society”.54 
Although Justice Wilson may have been willing to accept the use of 
objective liability standards in this particular context, much of the logic 
of both her insistence on the proof of fault under section 7 of the Charter 
and her rejection of deterrence under section 1 was rooted in her concern 
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about the need to respect the individual as a person who can make 
autonomous choices and is worthy of respect. 
Justice Wilson’s approach stands in contrast to that of Justice 
McLachlin, the third woman appointed to the Court, who dissented and 
held that the section 7 violation was justified as a reasonable limit under 
section 1 of the Charter that was necessary to deter sexual activity with 
girls under 14 years of age. Justice McLachlin stressed that there was a 
limit to how much older a girl was and the minimum costs for the 
accused of ascertaining the girl’s true age or desisting from sexual 
intercourse. She also suggested that the “lack of culpability” of an 
accused who did not know that the girl was under 14 years of age could 
be reflected in a diminished sentence because the statutory rape offence, 
while punishable by life imprisonment, did not have any mandatory 
minimum penalty. Justice Wilson responded to this last argument 
bluntly:  
Justice McLachlin recognizes that there is something troubling about 
subjecting someone who has made a genuine mistake of fact to life 
imprisonment. She feels that mental innocence may be taken into 
account when sentencing the accused. … this serves to highlight the 
weaknesses of arguments upholding the linking of life imprisonment to 
an absolute liability offence. … one cannot leave questions of mental 
innocence to the sentencing process. … Reliance on prosecutorial or 
judicial discretion to mitigate the harshness of an unjust law will 
provide little comfort to the mentally innocent and cannot, in my view, 
serve to justify a fundamentally unsound provision.55 
Justice Wilson rejected the idea that the prospect of benevolent 
prosecutorial or judicial discretion could save a law that violated the 
rights of a mentally innocent person not to be convicted of a criminal 
offence. 
There was also an intriguing difference of opinion between Justice 
Wilson and Justice McLachlin over the issue of equality. Justice Wilson 
rejected the accused’s argument that the offence violated section 15 of 
the Charter because it only applied to males. In contrast, Justice 
McLachlin took a more formal approach to equality which accepted that 
the male-only offence violated section 15 of the Charter but then held 
that the violation was justified under section 1 of the Charter. Justice 
Wilson stressed that section 15 should accommodate the biological 
reality that only females can become pregnant. Formal equality was just 
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not realistic when pregnancy was in issue. Justice Wilson’s conclusion 
that section 15 was not violated was also consistent with the idea that she 
has expressed in Andrews and Turpin that equality rights protected only 
groups vulnerable to discrimination and that men did not constitute such 
a group. 
Men may not, for Justice Wilson, have merited protection under 
section 15, but this was no excuse for not protecting their rights under 
section 7 of the Charter. She stressed that men accused of statutory rape 
were entitled to the same degree of protection under section 7 as all 
accused. She concluded that “one could not seek to justify the 
infringement of section 7 by pointing to the accused’s sex and by saying 
that because he is a man he is not entitled to the full protection of s. 7. It 
is no more open to the government to make this argument than it would 
be open to it to suggest that a woman procuring an abortion was not 
entitled to the full protection of s. 7 because she was a woman.”56 These 
statements were made at a time in the early 1990s when concern about 
sexual violence was at a very high level. Some serious consideration was 
given to the use of the override the next year when the Supreme Court 
struck down a “rape shield” restriction on the admissibility of a 
complainant’s prior sexual activity in sexual assault cases.57 The 
statements were also made before DNA exonerations indicated that some 
men had been wrongly convicted of sexual assault. Justice Wilson took a 
strong and, in progressive circles, unpopular stance on the importance of 
the section 7 rights of those accused of sexual assault because she was 
committed to liberal principles that required the state to respect the rights 
of all accused people.  
Justice Wilson’s defence of the principles of subjective fault was not 
absolute or unqualified. As discussed above, she seemed to accept that 
objective fault principles could be used in the statutory rape context. 
Moreover, she recognized in Tutton that Parliament was entitled to 
displace subjective fault standards if it did so clearly. Even when 
Parliament clearly imposed standards of reasonableness with respect to 
the defences of provocation and self-defence, however, Justice Wilson 
would attempt to apply those objective standards in a manner that was 
sensitive to the different circumstances that different individuals found 
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themselves in. To be sure, she did not convert objective standards to 
subjective standards. Justice Wilson paid too much attention to the text 
and purpose of the law to undertake such a crude strategy. Nevertheless, 
she did move objective standards in the direction of subjective standards. 
This approach was consistent with her concern about protecting all 
individuals from the state.  
One of Justice Wilson’s most sophisticated judgments was her 
dissent in R. v. Hill.58 The case involved a claim by a 16-year-old that he 
was provoked when his adult “Big Brother” made sexual advances to 
him. The judge instructed the jury to consider whether an ordinary 
person would have lost self-control in the circumstances without 
reference to the accused’s age or gender. Chief Justice Dickson 
dismissed the accused’s appeal from a murder conviction for the 
majority of the Court. He reasoned that the jury could be trusted to apply 
the appropriate ordinary person standard. Justice Wilson dissented and 
would have overturned Hill’s murder conviction and ordered a new trial. 
Justice Wilson related the text of the provocation defence with its 
reference to an ordinary person with its purpose which she saw as being 
to require uniform standards of self-control. She reasoned: 
The objective standard … may be said to exist in order to ensure that in 
the evaluation of the provocation defence there is no fluctuating 
standard of self-control against which accuseds are measured. The 
governing principles are those of equality and individual responsibility, 
so that all persons are held to the same standard notwithstanding their 
distinctive personality traits and varying capacities to achieve the 
standard. The success of a provocation defence rests on establishing 
the accused’s act as one which any ordinary person might have done in 
the circumstances and not upon eliciting the court’s compassion for an 
accused whose act was unjustified but who could not control himself in 
the way expected of an ordinary person. It is evident that any deviation 
from this objective standard against which an accused’s level of 
self-control is measured necessarily introduces an element of 
inequality in the way in which the actions of different persons are 
evaluated and must therefore be avoided if the underlying principle 
that all persons are equally responsible for their actions is to be 
maintained.59 
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The only exception to the universalism of the objective standard was for 
the age of the accused. The law had long recognized that the same 
standards of self-control could not be expected of young persons as 
adults. Other personal characteristics such as gender or race should not 
be considered in determining the appropriate level of self-control. Unlike 
Chief Justice Dickson, Justice Wilson would not rely on the common 
sense of the jury to ensure that the correct standard was applied. Age 
was for her the only factor that justified lowering the level of self-control 
that the objective standard demanded of all persons. 
Justice Wilson concluded that Hill’s gender was, however, relevant 
in placing the act or insult into context. She reasoned that such a use of 
personal characteristic does not “undermine the objective standard 
because it is done purely for the purpose of putting the insult into context 
and assessing its gravity”; in her view, “[t]he objective standard and its 
underlying principles of equality and individual responsibility are not … 
undermined when” factors such as gender or race “are taken into account 
only for the purpose of putting the provocative insult into context”.60 
Although this approach to placing the insult in context runs the risk of 
incorporating irrational and excessive responses to homosexual 
advances, it would still be disciplined by the refusal to factor Hill’s 
gender into the level of self-control required by the objective standard. 
In other words, the issue for Justice Wilson was how an ordinary person 
would respond to homosexual advances and not how an ordinary man 
would respond to them.  
The ordinary person is of course an artificial construct, but it would 
for Justice Wilson include both men and women. The excessively violent 
responses of some men to homosexual advances would be balanced off 
by the non-violent responses of some women to homosexual advances. 
Justice Wilson refused to incorporate understandings of masculinity that 
would promote a lack of self-control or an inclination to violence. All 
people were bound by equal standards of conduct that made them 
responsible for their actions, but in some cases, the trier of fact could not 
understand the full meaning of the act or insult without considering 
personal characteristics that were relevant to the specific act or insult. In 
the case of a homosexual advance, the accused’s gender required 
consideration even though it should not affect the level of self-control 
demanded by the law. 
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Justice Wilson’s careful approach in Hill to how and when the 
accused’s personal characteristics would be relevant when applying 
objective standards of conduct has unfortunately not won the day. Both 
the approach taken by Chief Justice Dickson for the majority of the 
Court in Hill and that taken by the majority of the Court in the 
subsequent R. v. Thibert61 case run the risk that personal characteristics 
other than age will erode the level of self-control expected of the 
accused. In particular, they invite consideration of how an ordinary man 
would react to the break-up of a relationship or to sexual advances by 
another man. The Court’s open-ended approach on these issues runs the 
real risk that violent images of masculinity will undermine objective 
standards of self-control. The Court’s undisciplined approach to the 
provocation defence has raised concerns that it will excuse unacceptable 
violence and that the courts have effectively eroded the purposes of the 
ordinary person standard.62 Although Justice Wilson had a preference for 
subjective standards of fault, she took Parliament’s use of objective 
standards seriously.63 Moreover, she attempted to factor in personal 
characteristics of the accused in a principled manner that was consistent 
with the text and purpose of the objective standard in the provocation 
defence. 
Justice Wilson’s best-known attempt to have objective standards 
reflect the personal characteristics of the accused was her landmark 
decision in the self-defence case of R. v. Lavallee.64 Lavallee dealt with 
whether expert evidence of battered woman’s syndrome was admissible 
in a case in which a battered woman shot her spouse in the back of the 
head after the spouse had threatened her. The Court held that the expert 
evidence was admissible and affirmed the jury’s acquittal. Nevertheless, 
it would be a mistake to conclude that Justice Wilson’s judgment tied 
self-defence to whether or not a woman manifested battered woman’s 
syndrome. Indeed, she specifically warned that “the fact that the 
appellant was a battered woman does not entitle her to an acquittal. 
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Battered women may well kill their partners other than in self-defence. 
The focus is not on who the woman is, but on what she did … 
Ultimately it is up to the jury to decide whether, in fact, the accused’s 
perceptions and actions were reasonable.”65 Justice Wilson was too much 
of a liberal individualist, not to mention a careful judge, to ever delegate 
the question of whether a person acted in self-defence to the diagnostic 
decisions made by health care professionals. Past battering should not be 
ignored, but the ultimate question was whether the accused’s actions 
were reasonably justified.  
Justice Wilson recognized the legitimacy of Parliament’s decision to 
require that the accused not only subjectively apprehend death or 
grievous bodily harm and subjectively believe that violent self-defence 
was necessary for self-preservation, but also that there be a reasonable 
basis for such beliefs. She did not convert self-defence into a subjective 
defence, even though her judgment in Tutton suggests that she believed 
that a subjective approach was best suited to ensuring that all accused in 
all their particularities were treated fairly. Nevertheless, she attempted to 
adapt Parliament’s clearly articulated objective standards to the 
particular context of battered women. 
In determining whether the accused had a reasonable apprehension 
of death or grievous bodily harm, Justice Wilson rejected the idea66 that 
an assault would have to be underway or imminent for the accused to 
have a reasonable apprehension of death or grievous bodily harm. She 
stressed that section 34(2) of the Criminal Code did not on its terms 
require an imminent attack. As discussed above, Justice Wilson took the 
text of the law seriously and she was concerned that the lower courts had 
read in restrictions to the defence that were not contemplated in the text 
that Parliament had enacted. 
An additional issue in Lavallee was whether the accused believed on 
reasonable grounds that she could not otherwise preserve herself from 
death or grievous bodily harm. This part of the self-defence test was the 
most challenging because it engaged the standard of reasonable conduct 
with respect to the use of violence that is expected of all persons. As 
discussed above, Justice Wilson had taken a fairly hard line on this issue 
in Hill by concluding that youth was the only personal characteristic that 
was relevant to the standard of self-control. At first reading, then, it 
might be concluded that her approach in Lavallee was at odds with her 
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approach four years earlier in Hill because she concluded in Lavallee 
that the gender and experience of the accused could be relevant to 
determining whether the accused had acted reasonably in killing her 
partner. 
Justice Wilson’s decision in Lavallee can, however, be reconciled 
with her judgment in Hill. In Lavallee, evidence about the accused’s 
characteristics and circumstances and the experiences of battered women 
would be used not to suggest that women were subject to lesser 
standards of self-control than men, but rather to compensate for a 
number of disadvantages that only women would experience in a self-
defence scenario. Justice Wilson was concerned that judges and juries 
might reject a battered woman’s self-defence claim on the unrealistic 
basis that the woman always had the alternative of leaving the abusive 
relationship as opposed to resorting to violent self-help. Justice Wilson 
addressed this danger directly and concluded that “it is not for the jury to 
pass judgment on the fact that an accused battered woman stayed in the 
relationship. Still less is it entitled to conclude that she forfeited her right 
to self-defence for having done so.”67 Gender was not to be considered in 
order to hold women to lower standards of self-control, but rather to 
ensure that the circumstances of battered women were fairly considered 
and evaluated by the trier of fact.  
Although Lavallee created a new contextualized approach to self-
defence, Justice Wilson also attempted to justify her new approach by 
adapting traditional concepts of self-defence to the circumstances of 
battered women. To this end, she argued “that traditional self-defence 
doctrine does not require a person to retreat from her home instead of 
defending herself. … A man’s home may be his castle but it is also the 
woman’s home even if it seems to her more like a prison in the cir-
cumstances.”68 This statement is based on the premise that the standard 
of self-control traditionally expected of people by the law of self-defence 
did not require retreat. Justice Wilson was prepared to accept a fairly 
generous ambit for self-defence for all individuals and this made it easier 
for her to expand the ambit of self-defence in Lavallee. She would have 
agreed with a subsequent decision that stressed that it was the accused 
who deserved the benefit of the doubt in self-defence cases.69  
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A careful reading of Lavallee suggests that many of the criticisms 
that it has received from both feminists and those skeptical of battered 
women syndrome are unfair. A number of feminist commentators and 
Justice L’Heureux-Dubé in R. v. Malott70 have raised concerns that a 
focus on battered women’s syndrome might medicalize self-defence for 
battered women and make it difficult for battered women who do not fit 
into psychological profiles of a battered woman to claim the defence. 
These criticisms are in my view allayed by Justice Wilson’s focus on the 
individual accused. The corollary of her warning that not all battered 
women will necessarily act in self-defence is the proposition that women 
may act in self-defence even if they are not diagnosed as battered 
women. To be sure, there may be problems of convincing juries to 
accept a defence in the absence of expert evidence, but from a doctrinal 
perspective, Justice Wilson’s approach was very much focused on the 
individual. 
Others have criticized Lavallee as based on junk science and 
advocacy for women.71 Although the science behind battered women’s 
syndrome can indeed be questioned, it is unfair to characterize Lavallee 
as ignoring the text and purpose of section 34(2) of the Code or as 
mandating the acquittal of all women who are diagnosed as having 
battered women’s syndrome. Justice Wilson made quite clear that not all 
battered women will act in self-defence. At the end of the day, the trier 
of fact must be convinced not only that the accused believed that 
violence was the only way to avoid more battering, but also that this 
belief was reasonable. As in all her criminal law decisions, Justice 
Wilson focused on the individual accused and the need to give that 
individual any benefit of the doubt about guilt.  
V. THE REQUIREMENT THAT THE STATE JUSTIFY 
INVASIONS OF LIBERTY 
The Supreme Court has had second thoughts about the rigorous 
Oakes72 standard for justifying limits on rights from the start. In the same 
year as he penned Oakes with its insistence that the state take the least 
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drastic possible approach to limiting Charter rights, Justice Dickson also 
authored R. v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd.,73 which stressed the need to 
defer to reasonable attempts by the legislature to balance conflicting 
interests and accommodate rights in its legislative program. 
The issue in Edwards Books was an exemption in a provincial 
Sunday closing law that allowed businesses with no more than seven 
employees that closed for religious reasons on a business day to be open 
on Sunday as a form of reasonable accommodation. Justice Dickson 
concluded for the majority of the Court that the state had acted 
reasonably even though its exemption would not apply to larger stores 
that closed for religious reasons on a Saturday. He stressed the secular 
legislative purpose of the Sunday closing law in providing for a common 
result day. 
Justice Wilson dissented on the basis that the state had failed to 
demonstrate why it could not accommodate all businesses that closed for 
religious reasons on days other than Sunday. She characterized the 
legislature’s line drawing as unprincipled and productive of a 
“checkerboard”74 approach to rights. Freedom of religion should, in her 
view, protect “the rights of all members of the group. It does not make 
fish of some and fowl of the others. For, quite apart from considerations 
of equality, to do so is to introduce an invidious distinction into the 
group and sever the religious and cultural tie that binds them together.”75 
As in Singh,76 Justice Wilson was not satisfied with arguments that some 
members of a minority would be treated fairly. Everyone in the group 
should be treated fairly. This was a liberal’s insistence that each and 
every individual be treated fairly. 
Justice Wilson was also concerned that the government had failed to 
discharge its burden of justifying the infringement of the right to 
freedom of religion. She stressed that the “Crown adduced no evidence 
to establish that permitting all retailers who close on Saturdays on 
religious grounds to stay open on Sundays would cause a substantial 
disruption of the common pause day”.77 In her remaining years on the 
Court, Justice Wilson was a fierce defender of a rigorous version of the 
Oakes test. Her stubborn consistency on the question of justification was 
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based on liberal principles that stressed the need to protect the individual 
from the state and to restrain state activity that harmed the rights of 
individuals.  
Justice Wilson parted company with Chief Justice Dickson again in 
a series of cases involving prostitution laws. The main decision involved 
a broad 1985 law that was enacted against all forms of public solicitation 
for the purpose of prostitution. Justice Dickson accepted that the law was 
a reasonable response to the public nuisance of solicitation. Justice 
Wilson, with the concurrence of Justice L’Heureux-Dubé, dissented on 
the basis that the law was overbroad and would apply to expression that 
would not produce any public nuisance.78 The dissent was based on 
standard overbreadth analysis rather than a feminist critique of laws 
against street prostitution. Justice Lamer was the only judge to discuss 
feminist writings in his judgment. He believed that they supported his 
conclusion that the law should be upheld as an attempt to protect street 
prostitutes as a disadvantaged group. Justice Wilson may have had 
concerns about the disadvantaging effects of prostitution laws on 
women, but she was most comfortable with an analysis that stressed the 
importance of the individual’s freedom of expression and association 
and the state’s overbreadth in responding to public nuisances. 
Justice Wilson parted company with Justice Lamer again in 1990 on 
the question of whether the reverse onus placed on the accused to 
establish the insanity defence could be justified under section 1 of the 
Charter. Justice Lamer, for the majority of the Court, was influenced by 
the traditional nature of the reverse onus and the possible dangers of 
acquitting people whenever there was a reasonable doubt about their 
insanity. Justice Wilson in her dissent stressed the need to focus on the 
criminal context of the case. She explained: 
In my view, this is not a situation calling for a departure from the strict 
standard of review set forth in Oakes. On the contrary, the issue on 
appeal seems to be the quintessential case of the state acting as the 
“singular antagonist” of a very basic legal right of the accused rather 
than in the role of “mediating between different groups” as discussed 
in Irwin Toy. This is, in my view, an appropriate case in which to 
apply the stricter standard of review on the “minimal impairment” 
issue.79 
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She also concluded that the American experience with the less 
restrictive alternative of only placing an evidential burden on the accused 
demonstrated that the government had not justified the traditional 
reverse onus as the least rights restrictive means to control the insanity 
defence. She parted company with Justice Lamer the next year in Swain80 
when she concluded that allowing the Crown to raise the insanity 
defence when the accused put his or her state of mind in issue could not 
be justified under section 1 as a reasonable limitation on the accused’s 
right to control his or her own defence. Again, she stressed that the state 
was acting as “the singular antagonist” of the accused and that there was 
“no room for deference to the legislature” when the courts themselves 
were reformulating a common law rule to make it consistent with the 
Charter. 
Justice Wilson was again in lonely dissent when she found that the 
government had not justified mandatory retirement at 65 years of age. 
Although this case arose outside of the criminal context and in the 
context of universities, Justice Wilson still focused more on the effects 
of mandatory retirement laws on individuals than she did on the 
government’s attempt to mediate between the claims of competing 
generations. She rejected the idea that mandatory retirement was 
necessary to do justice to “younger academics”. In her view, the 
government had created a conflict between younger and older academics 
by starving the universities for cash. Despite recognizing that the Court 
had sanctioned some departures from the strict Oakes requirement, she 
remained uncomfortable with the trend: 
This Court has stressed that the standard which presumptively applies 
is that of Oakes. It is only in exceptional circumstances that the full 
rigours of Oakes should be ameliorated. The onus in this case was on 
the respondent universities to show that the application of a more 
relaxed test under s. 1 was appropriate. In my respectful view that onus 
has not been met.81 
Justice Wilson also stressed that the universities could make room 
for young academics by offering incentives to older professors to take 
voluntary retirement as opposed to forcing all older professors to retire. 
She was offended by the notion that individuals were being forced to 
retire. She also rejected the idea that mandatory retirement was a 
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package deal that was tied to pensions and other benefits. With the same 
insistence as in Edwards Books that the rights of everyone affected be 
considered, she noted that non-unionized employees and those who 
joined the workforce late (mostly women) would be severely affected by 
mandatory retirement. A concern about the rights of all individuals made 
her focus on the rights of the most vulnerable. 
One decision that stands in contrast to the above dissents was Justice 
Wilson’s decision to join with Chief Justice Dickson, L’Heureux-Dubé 
and Gonthier in R. v. Keegstra82 to uphold the hate propaganda offence as 
a reasonable limit on freedom of expression and the presumption of 
innocence. Justice McLachlin’s dissent which would have struck down the 
offence appears to be more consistent with Justice Wilson’s approach to 
section 1 than Chief Justice Dickson’s majority decision holding the 
government had justified the limits on freedom of expression and the 
presumption of innocence. The majority’s decision in Keegstra has been 
cited by some of evidence of the Court’s tendency to follow the lead of a 
Court party of post-materialistic elites, in this case a range of equality-
seeking groups that intervened in support of the hate propaganda law.83 
There may indeed be some inconsistency between Justice Wilson’s 
general approach to section 1 and her concurrence with Chief Justice 
Dickson in Keegstra. That said, a case for the consistency of Justice 
Wilson’s position can be made on the basis that the majority in Keegstra 
was concerned that the very conditions of liberalism that allow each 
individual the maximum liberty and opportunity to pursue his or her life 
goals would be thwarted in a world where those who promoted hate 
against identifiable groups were given the benefit of any reasonable 
doubt. To this extent, Justice Wilson may have concluded that hate 
speech presented a sui generis threat to liberalism that was not present in 
other section 1 cases discussed above where she found that the state had 
failed to justify the necessity of limiting Charter rights. In any event, the 
Court as an institution remained ambivalent about the deference to the 
state that it displayed in Keegstra. Two years later, Justice McLachlin 
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found herself in a majority striking down the false news offence in R. v. 
Zundel84 on the basis that the state had not justified an overbroad 
restriction on freedom of expression.  
Unfortunately, by this time Justice Wilson had retired from the 
Court. We will never know for certain how she would have decided that 
case. I suspect, however, that Justice Wilson would have agreed with 
Justice McLachlin and struck down the false news provision as an 
overbroad restriction on freedom of expression. Had she remained on the 
Court a few more years, Justice Wilson might also have changed the 
result in cases such as R. v. Wholesale Travel Group Inc.85 and R. v. 
Creighton86 by perhaps siding with Justice Lamer in his dissents in those 
cases. Canadian criminal law might look quite different today had 
Justice Wilson remained on the bench until she reached the mandatory 
retirement age of 75.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
There is no point in speculating about historical might-have-beens. 
There is, however, a point in better understanding the underlying 
philosophy that motivated the many important decisions made by Justice 
Bertha Wilson during her distinguished service on the Supreme Court. 
Although Justice Wilson will understandably be remembered as the first 
woman who served on the Supreme Court, it has been suggested in this 
essay that her most distinctive and important contribution to the work of 
the Supreme Court at a critical time in its history was her steadfast 
commitment to the principles of classical liberalism that protected 
individuals in all their individuality from the state. 
Justice Wilson was aware of the many disadvantages faced by 
women, but she consistently favoured liberal strategies that, by protecting 
the rights and freedoms of all individuals, would often have an 
ameliorating effect on the conditions of women. In the statutory rape case 
of Hess, she was not persuaded by strong arguments that maximizing the 
liberty of the individual accused in relation to the state would have 
disadvantaging effects on women. Her defence of a woman’s right to 
choose in Morgentaler87 was grounded in a consistent application of 
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liberal principles that defended the rights and freedoms of all individuals 
from the state. The decision benefited women, but it was grounded in a 
consistent and principled stance that defended the rights of all individuals 
from the state.  
The animating principle in Justice Wilson’s celebrated concurrence 
in Morgentaler and in her criminal law and Charter jurisprudence was an 
abiding concern about protecting the individual from the state. The 
insight about the primacy of Justice Wilson’s classical liberalism and 
individualism is important in understanding her outstanding but fre-
quently dissenting contribution to Canadian jurisprudence. It may also 
be helpful in understanding the future. There seem to be few judges 
today who are as committed to the principles of subjective fault and 
strict justification of any limits on rights as Justice Wilson. Today, 
context is everything. The liberal principles that Justice Wilson espoused 
are often tempered, if not diluted.  
It is unfortunate that so few judges today are prepared to follow in 
Justice Wilson’s footsteps. Liberalism that defends the right of the 
individual against the power of the state and the collectivity is somewhat 
out of favour in a post-September 11 world that is preoccupied with the 
fear of crime and terrorism. Justice Wilson’s insistence on strict 
justification under section 1 of the Charter has been overtaken by a 
contextualism that at times seems devoid of principle or predictability. 
Justice Wilson’s preference for subjective fault in the criminal law is 
under siege as the state continues to expand the criminal sanction and 
make increasing use of negligence-based forms of criminal liability. The 
Supreme Court has seemingly abandoned the project of constitutionalizing 
subjective fault even for serious crimes. The presumption of innocence 
that is designed to give the individual accused the benefit of the doubt is 
today more honoured in its breach, or at least through a section 1 
justification. Justice Wilson’s retirement from the Court and now her 
death will prevent us from seeing the present through her eyes. This is a 
matter of great regret because she served as a principled conscience for 
liberal values that are an important part of our heritage. 
